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Asia and Latin America in the 1990s 
EVAN TANNER*
Exchange market pressure (EMP), the sum of exchange rate depreciation and
reserve outflows (scaled by base money), summarizes the flow excess supply of
money in a managed exchange rate regime. This paper examines Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, and finds that monetary policy affects
EMP as generally expected: contractionary monetary policy helps to reduce EMP.
The monetary policy stance is best measured by domestic credit growth (since
interest rates contain both policy- and market-determined elements). In response to
higher EMP, monetary authorities boosted domestic credit growth both in Mexico
(confirming previous research) and in the Asian countries. [JEL E4, F3, F4]
T
he term “exchange market pressure” (EMP) generally refers to movements in
two key external sector variables: (official) international reserve holdings and
the (nominal) exchange rate.1 Girton and Roper’s (1977) seminal paper more
precisely defined EMP as the sum of exchange rate depreciation and reserve
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1Of course, strains on a country's external sector might also be measured by the differential between
domestic and world interest rates. In this vein, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) construct an EMP
measure that includes the interest differential. Here, the interest differential will be treated as a determi-
nant of EMP. Evan Tanner
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outflows (scaled by base money).2 Such a measure summarizes the difference
between the growth rates of money supply and demand under managed exchange
rate regimes.3
Recent difficulties in Asia and Latin America highlight several issues
regarding EMP. For example, the relative importance of foreign and domestic
factors on EMP in these countries is widely debated. To be sure, most observers
believe that certain fundamental domestic factors—such as monetary, fiscal, and
financial policies—affect a country’s external sector. However, shocks from
abroad do so as well, in both asset and goods markets. In this vein, many
observers have stressed the importance of contagious elements in global markets,
especially during the 1990s.4
This paper addresses three related questions regarding the relationship
between EMP and monetary policy in selected Asian and Latin American coun-
tries. First, does monetary policy affect EMP in the way that standard monetary
frameworks predict? For example, does contractionary monetary policy help
reduce EMP? Second, how should the stance of monetary policy be measured?
Currently, most authors emphasize interest rates,5 whereas older literature
emphasized monetary aggregates. For example, in the traditional monetary
approach to the balance of payments, the domestic credit component of the
monetary base was considered to be the variable controlled by policy makers.
This paper proposes a compromise that emphasizes domestic credit growth as
the policy variable but also includes the differential between domestic and U.S.
interest rates.6 Third, in what sense is the stance of monetary policy itself a
function of EMP? Do monetary authorities respond to increases in EMP by
tightening monetary policy? Or, do they sterilize EMP increases with more
domestic credit, as several recent papers (Flood, Garber, and Kramer, 1996;
Calvo and Mendoza, 1996) suggest?
To address these questions, this paper develops a vector autoregression (VAR)
framework, whose variables include EMP, domestic credit growth, and the differ-
ential between domestic and foreign interest rates.7 This framework shows the
2Other papers that present models of EMP include Connolly and Da Silveira (1979) for Brazil; Brisimis
and Leventakis (1984) for Greece; Weymark (1995) for Canada; Wohar and Lee (1992) for Korea; and Burkett
and Richards (1993) for Paraguay. Ahluwalia (2000) constructs a variant of EMP for several countries.  More
recently, several papers have used EMP indirectly to construct a discrete crisis indicator. These include
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998).  However, different
from other papers, this one examines the recent behavior of EMP in emerging markets, and it does so directly. 
3Under managed or dirty floats, authorities limit exchange rate flexibility by purchasing or selling
international reserves. Under such a regime, it would be misleading to focus on either exchange rate
growth or reserves movements alone.   
4For a test of contagious effects on interest rates in Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, see Edwards (1998). 
5See, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), who use the federal funds rate to measure the stance
of monetary policy in the United States. 
6Basurto and Ghosh (2000) also argue that, for the Asian economies, interest rates may not be good
indicators of the stance of monetary policy. 
7In a monetary framework, a scale variable for money demand should also be included. Most
frequently, this variable is gross domestic product (GDP). However, this study uses monthly data, for
which GDP is not available. A proxy, the industrial production index, is available for some countries.
Difficulties in using this variable are discussed in the paper. response of EMP to innovations in the other two variables (including shocks to
monetary policy).8 And, the framework yields a policy reaction function that
summarizes the effects of lagged innovations in both EMP and the interest differ-
ential on domestic credit growth. 
The countries in this study are Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and
Thailand. In choosing countries, it is natural to compare the Mexican experience of
1994–95 with the more recent episodes in major Asian economies like Indonesia,
Korea, and Thailand. And Brazil, Mexico, and Chile help illustrate different
responses to both the Asian crisis of 1997–98 and the Russian default in 1998.9
Issues raised in this paper are closely linked to several recent debates. For
example, during the Asian difficulties, many asked whether policy makers could
successfully defend exchange rates with tight monetary policy, and, specifically,
with high interest rates.10 Some have even suggested that a Laffer curve exists
under certain conditions: contractionary policy may cause panic among investors
and thus a loss (rather than a gain) of a currency’s value.11 This paper helps to test
such a proposition.12 Unlike other papers, though, this one focuses on EMP rather
than exchange rates. Since the Asian countries in this study did not pursue either
fixed or freely floating exchange rate policies, it may be misleading to examine
exchange rate behavior without considering reserves as well. For example, Korea
gained international reserves during 1998, and EMPwas negative, even as the won
depreciated. Since the EMP measure includes both exchange depreciation and
reserves, it provides a more complete picture than either variable alone. Critically,
this paper finds that monetary policy affects EMP as expected: contractionary
monetary policy helps to reduce EMP.13
Arelated issue is whether monetary policy was “tight” or “loose” in emerging
market economies during and after the more recent crises. Regarding the Mexican
crisis of 1994–95, there is much agreement that reserve outflows were initially
sterilized with increases of domestic credit by the central bank (see, for example,
Calvo and Mendoza, 1996; Flood, Garber, and Kramer, 1996). Regarding Asia,
there is considerable debate as to whether monetary policy was “tight” or “loose.”
The popular press highlighted episodes of tight monetary policy. However,
according to an IMF study (Lane and others, 1999) the postcrisis monetary targets
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8In a VAR, such innovations are contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term of any other
variable and hence may be thought of as “exogenous” or “policy” variables. Others have applied such
techniques to US monetary policy, including Christiano (1995); Christiano, Evans, and Eichenbaum
(1998); and Bernanke and Mihov (1998). For an application to Mexico, see Edwards and Savastano
(1998).
9All data are monthly, covering the period 1990:1 through late 1998.
10See Radelet and Sachs (1998), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Goldfajn and Baig (1998), Goldfajn and
Gupta (1998), Ghosh and Ghosh (1999), and Lane and others (1999).  Another, broader question that arose
during the recent crises was whether the benefits of contractionary monetary policy outweighed their
costs. This paper does not address that question.
11See, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998). 
12This issue is addressed by Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998); Krugman (1998); and is tested by
Goldfajn and Gupta (1998). 
13While the stance of monetary policy is better measured in this context by domestic credit growth,
rather than interest rates (which contain both policy- and market-determined elements), both measures
affect EMP as expected, and significantly so. in Korea and Thailand, which both countries met, were contractionary, but not
drastically so. (By contrast, money growth in Indonesia exceeded its targets.)
Elsewhere, Goldfajn and Baig (1998) find no evidence that postcrisis monetary
policy in Asia was “overly tight.” At another extreme, Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (1998) characterize monetary policy in these countries as “loose,” at least
in the early stages of the crisis. 
The current framework addresses this question somewhat differently: it asks
whether monetary policy was systematically tightened or loosened in response
to higher EMP. Critically, this paper finds that, in response to higher EMP,
monetary authorities in the Asian countries increased domestic credit growth,
much as the Mexicans did during the 1994–95 crisis. Such a finding should not
be surprising: in the initial phases of the crisis (i.e., early 1997) Asian central
banks extended credit to ailing financial institutions but did not raise interest
rates. And, while this policy reaction was clearly destabilizing, it may have been
politically difficult to avoid. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Part I, EMP is moti-
vated in a monetary framework. In Part II, a vector autoregression approach is
presented. In Part III, empirical estimates are presented. In Part IV, some conclu-
sions are presented. 
I. Motivation for Exchange Market Pressure 
Many countries permit some exchange rate flexibility but also intervene in
markets with purchases or sales of international reserves. For such regimes, it is
misleading to focus on either exchange rate growth or reserves movements alone.
Instead, under such a managed float, EMP represents the difference between the
growth rates of domestic money supply and money demand, reflected in both
exchange rate and reserve movements. To see this, consider the following simple
monetary model. On the demand side, the growth of real base money (mt) is: 
mt = ∆ Mt/Mt–1 – π t (1)
where Mt is nominal (base) money at time t and π t is the inflation rate (∆ Pt/Pt–1,
where Pt is the price level at time t).14 The inflation rate is linked to world infla-
tion π t* through the rate of growth of the nominal exchange rate et (units of the
country’s currency per U.S. dollar):
et = π t – π t* + zt (2)
where zt is the deviation from purchasing power parity. On the supply side, the two
components of nominal base money are international reserves Rt and net domestic
assets Dt. Thus,
∆ Mt/Mt–1 = (∆ Rt + ∆ Dt)/Mt–1 = rt + δ t (3)
Evan Tanner
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14Of course, while not explicitly modeled here, the growth rate of money demand mt is determined
by the growth of transactions (i.e., gross domestic product) and opportunity costs (i.e., interest rates). where rt = ∆ Rt/Mt–1 and δ t = ∆ Dt/Mt–1. The above equations restate the traditional
monetary approach. Assuming that purchasing power parity holds and world infla-
tion equals zero (zt = π t* = 0), substitute equations (2) and (3) into (1) and rear-
range to obtain an expression for EMP:
EMPt   et – rt = δ t – mt. (4)
According to equation (4), exchange rate depreciation plus reserve outflows
(scaled by base money) equals the difference between the growth rates of the
domestic component of the monetary base (δ t) and money demand (mt).15 Under
a fixed exchange rate regime, et = 0; with freely floating exchange rates, rt = 0.
Equation (4) shows the link between EMP and monetary policy, measured by
δ t , the portion of the monetary base controlled by domestic policy makers. If real
money demand is constant (m = 0), EMP and δ should move together, one-to-one.
Of course, to control δ , central banks may set interest rates. In this sense, contrac-
tionary monetary policy will raise the differential between domestic and world
(U.S.) interest rates (φ), encourage capital inflows, and thus reduce EMP.
However, φ may be a noisy indicator of monetary policy, since it contains market
elements as well, including expected exchange depreciation and a risk premium.
Plots of EMP,  δ , and φ for Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and
Thailand (Figure 1) illustrate several points.16 First, these plots confirm the link
between EMP and monetary policy: EMP and δ move together closely, especially
during certain crisis periods. The relationship between EMP and φ is not as close,
further suggesting that φ is a noisy indicator of monetary policy. These observations
are confirmed in an earlier version of this paper.17 As further evidence of the co-
movements of these variables, note that in Mexico both EMP and  δ increased
dramatically (while φ fell) during the severe 1994–95 crisis and during two previous,
less severe episodes (November 1993 and March/April 1994). By mid-1995, in the
aftermath of the crisis, both EMP and δ fell, while φ increased dramatically and did
not return to its precrisis level until mid-1997. By contrast, the Central Bank of
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15This definition may also be obtained for the more general case of non-zero π *. An even more
general definition of EMP is (e – α r) where α is a reduced-form coefficient that depends on several under-
lying structural parameters. Under standard assumptions of the monetary approach to exchange rates and
the balance of payments, α should be unity. Subsequently, other authors relaxed these assumptions (see,
for example, Weymark, 1998) and found that α might be difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, α is commonly
set to unity, as doing so yields an informative indicator (although not necessarily implied by a deeper
structural model). Alternative scalings, not directly related to the monetary approach, are proposed by
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Ahluwalia (2000).
16All data in this study are monthly, obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. For
all countries, international reserves and the monetary base are defined as Series 1l.d and 14, respectively.
For Brazil, Indonesia, and Thailand, domestic credit is defined as the sum of central bank credit to the
government (Series 12a) and to the financial system (for Indonesia, 12e; for Thailand and Brazil,12e and
12f). For Chile, Mexico, and Korea, domestic credit is defined as the difference between the monetary
base and net foreign assets (Series 14 minus series 12 plus 16c plus 16cl.) In all cases, φ is measured as
the difference on deposit interest rates.
17Tanner (1999), wherein simple bivariate regressions of EMP on δ and φ are presented. Adjusted R2
statistics from these regressions indicate the importance of money supply shocks in explaining total EMP.
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Thailand
Note: EMP, domestic credit growth (δ ), in percent per month, left axis. Interest differential (φ ) in
percent, right axis.Brazil was forced to defend their newly created currency, the real, in March 1995
(shortly after the Mexican crisis) by increasing φ , even as both EMP and δ rose.
Chile suffered less from the “tequila spillover” than many other Latin American
countries.18 Nonetheless during mid-1995 as EMP rose, so did δ , while φ fell. 
In the selected Asian countries, EMP had been historically much lower than
in Latin American countries. By the mid-1990s, there were growing financial
fragilities (see Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998; Lane and others, 1999; and
Baliño and Ubide, 1999). Beginning in mid-1997 both EMP and δ rose, first in
Thailand, next Indonesia, and then Korea, suggesting that the crises were fore-
shadowed by a period of loose monetary policy—gradually for several months and
then more rapidly. In the aftermath of the crises, both EMP and δ fell, while φ rose
and generally remained high for several months thereafter. 
Among Latin American countries, responses to the 1997–98 Asian events and
to the 1998 Russian default varied. Mexico’s response was to loosen monetary
policy: as EMP rose, so did δ , while φ fell. By contrast, Brazil tightened: EMP
rose, δ fell, and φ rose. In Chile, as EMP rose, so did both δ and φ . 
II. EMP and Monetary Policy: A Vector Autoregression Approach
In this section, a vector autoregression (VAR) framework is developed to deter-
mine whether monetary policy affects EMP in the direction presumed by standard
monetary theory. A key feature of this framework is how monetary policy is
modeled. In most recent research on industrialized countries, an interest rate is
considered to be the policy variable. However, as discussed above, interest rates
make a noisy indicator of monetary policy. For this reason, a compromise strategy
is developed that includes both a monetary aggregate (δ ) and the interest differen-
tial (φ ). The system is:19
Xt = a0 + a1Xt-1 + a2Xt-2 + .... + vt (5)
where X = (δ , EMP, φ ) is a matrix of variables, ai is a vector of coefficients, and
vt = (vδ , vE, vφ ) is a vector of error terms.20 A system like (5) permits testing for
effects of past values of X on current values. Assumptions regarding the
exogeneity of certain variables (like a policy variable) are easily incorporated into
a system like (5). To do so, first assume that each element of the error vector vt is,
in turn, composed of “own” error terms wt = (wδ , wE, wφ ) and contemporaneous
correlations with “other” errors. That is: 
vt = Bwt (6)
where B is a 3 x 3 matrix whose diagonal elements (own correlations) equal one
and whose nonzero off-diagonal elements reflect contemporaneous correlations
Evan Tanner
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18On this point, see Edwards (1998).
19For industrialized countries, other studies that use a VAR methodology to examine monetary policy
include Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992); Friedman and Kuttner (1992); Kashyap, Stien, and Wilcox
(1993); Strongin (1995); and Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
20In all cases, φ is measured as the difference on deposit interest rates. For Mexico and Korea, since
φ t is nonstationary in levels but stationary in first differences, it is entered accordingly as ∆φ . among the error terms. Now, assumptions regarding the exogeneity of certain
variables may be incorporated in restrictions on the matrix B (i.e., ordering of
the variables).21
As discussed above, the domestic credit growth variable δ is assumed to be
exogenous. That is, in any period, innovations to δ  (i.e., vδ ) reflect only the tastes
and preferences of the policymaker:
vδ t = wδ t (7)
Next, shocks to exchange market pressure (vE) contain two elements: the
“own” shock (wE) plus one related to innovations in domestic credit: 
vEt = wEt + b21wδ t (8)
Thus, wE may be thought of as a shock to the demand for a country’s currency,
attributable perhaps to changes in investor confidence and sentiment. Thus, b21wδ t
represents the portion of shocks to EMP that is contemporaneously correlated with
domestic credit growth. 
Finally, shocks to the change in the interest rate differential (wφ ) is the sum of
three elements: the “own” shock (wE) plus the ones related to innovations in
domestic credit and EMP: 
vφ t = wφ t + b31wδ t + b32wEt (9)
According to equation (9), innovations to domestic credit wδ affect the
interest rate differential through either standard liquidity or Fisher channels.
Also, according to balance of payments crises models, the value of b31 may
itself depend on the whether market participants expect an exchange rate
crisis.22 Thus, the predicted sign of b31 is ambiguous. And, since the value of
this parameter may depend on the exchange rate regime, estimates in the next
section include tests for parameter stability. Second, the interest rate differen-
tial should respond to changes in EMP: a rise in EMP may signal either further
exchange rate depreciation in the future, or additional risk, or both. Such effects
are captured in the term b32wEt and b32 should be greater than zero. The “own”
shock wφ thus contains other factors not contained in either wδ or wE. This
component should be thought of as a “hybrid” that potentially contains both
policy- and market-determined elements.23
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21To implement these restrictions, either a Choleski decomposition or a procedure like Bernanke’s
(1986) may be used. See also Enders (1995), Chapter 5. Of course, different assumptions about
exogeneity imply different restrictions (i.e., orderings in a Choleski decomposition). However, as
discussed in the next section, results were largely insensitive to alternative orderings.
22For example, Flood and Garber (1984) show that prior to an exchange rate crisis, but not after, the
forward premium (FP) is a linear function of domestic credit:  FP/ δ (D) > 0 for 0 < D < D*, where D*
is the level of domestic credit that precipitates an exchange rate crisis. Note that in this context, the
implied forward premium is E{[(1+i)/(1+iUS) – 1], where i and iUS are domestic and U.S. interest rates.
Thus, for all D,  φ / δ =  FP/ δ * (1+iUS)/E.
23An alternative assumption would be for EMP to be contemporaneously determined by both δ and
∆φ . In this case, equation (8) would be rewritten as: vEt =  wEt + b21wδ t + b23wφ t. Since φ reflects the oppor-
tunity cost of holding money, b23 > 0. However, under this assumption, for the system also to be just iden-
tified, b31 must be zero in equation (9).In addition to the contemporaneous relationships shown in equations (7)
through (9), impulse response functions (IRFs) summarize the effect of past inno-
vations (i.e., lagged elements of w) to current values of X. Thus, IRFs provide two
additional ways to evaluate the effect of monetary policy on EMP. First, IRFs
show effects on EMP of both current and past innovations to domestic credit (wδ ).
Second, IRFs also show effects on EMP of past (but not current) innovations to
the interest rate differential (wφ ). But, this latter IRF may only be thought of as a
policy relationship insofar as innovations to the interest rate differential represent
policy shocks. (Note also that IRFs show effects on φ of both current and past
innovations to domestic credit and EMP, wδ and wE, respectively.)
However, the framework discussed above also helps to address the paper’s
third main question, namely, how the monetary policy stance is determined.
Specifically, the IRFs provide a policy reaction function: they show effects on
current δ of past (but not current) innovations to EMP (wE) and changes in the
interest rate differential (wφ t).24 For example, when faced by positive innovations
to  EMP (for example, a decrease in investor confidence) policymakers may
respond “prudently” with contractionary policy (reducing δ ). However, policy-
makers might face pressures to act otherwise.
This is especially true if the authority attempts to defend the exchange rate
during a financial panic. As investors reduce holdings of a country’s currency,
both financial system deposits and central bank reserves fall (EMP rises). At the
same time, the central bank is also pressured to provide liquidity to the financial
system, raising δ . Such a sequence of events, in the context of balance of payments
crises and speculative attacks, is discussed in several papers, including Flood,
Garber, and Kramer (1996) and Calvo and Mendoza (1996).
III. Estimation Results
Individual country estimates, presented in this section, use data from 1990 through
1998. To focus on the recent crisis period, pooled estimates, using data from 1996
to 1998, are also presented below. For both individual and pooled estimates, tests
for stability of parameters, precrisis versus postcrisis, are presented.25
Individual Country Estimates, 1990–98
Estimation results, including adjusted R2s and exclusion (Granger causality) tests
are summarized in Table 1. IRFs (generated by the Choleski decomposition as




24Note that the issue addressed here is similar to that of exchange rate targeting. For example,
Edwards and Savastano (1998) also estimate a policy reaction function for Mexico during the mid-1990s.
However, they examine the effect of changes in the exchange rate (rather than EMP) on M1 (rather than
domestic credit of the central bank). 
25Estimations presented include 4 lags. Other lag lengths provided qualitatively similar results. For
parameter stability tests, to obtain sufficient degrees of freedom, 2 lags were used.  
26An IRF summarizes the response of a variable in X to a one-unit innovation in w.Shocks to the domestic credit growth variable (wδ ) are important for
explaining EMP. The estimates suggest that shocks to δ affect EMP positively, as
expected. As Table 1 shows, for four out of six countries (Indonesia, Korea,
Thailand, Brazil) the hypothesis that lagged δ does not help explain current EMP
is rejected at the 95 percent level or better. However, as Table 2 shows, for all
countries, there are positive and significant IRFs for at least the current period
(period 0).27 For all countries except Chile, the magnitude of the initial shock
exceeds one. That is, a 1 percent shock to domestic credit leads to a change in
exchange market pressure that exceeds 1 percent. For Indonesia, Thailand, and
Brazil, there are lagged positive effects. Korea, however, presents an anomaly, as
some lagged effects are negative and significant.
Some evidence also suggests that shocks to the interest differential (wφ ) affect
EMP. However, this evidence is weaker than that linking EMP to δ , above. Like
domestic credit, (see Table 1) the hypothesis that lagged φ does not help explain
current EMP is rejected at the 90 percent level or better in four out of six coun-
tries (Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico). The IRFs in Table 2, though, provide
somewhat weaker evidence than that for domestic credit growth δ . For four out of
six countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, and Mexico) there are significant IRFs
for at least one period. 
These effects are negative, suggesting that positive innovations in the
domestic interest rate help increase and support the exchange rate (i.e., reduce
EMP). However, unlike the corresponding effects for δ , these effects happen
immediately in only two countries, Indonesia and Mexico. In Thailand, effects
occur with a one-month lag, while in Brazil, effects take place after two months. 
In most cases, shocks to EMP (wE) affect the interest differential positively.
This should not be surprising, since an increase in EMP is generally associated
with an increase in either expected exchange depreciation, risk, or both. For three
of the six countries (Indonesia, Korea, Mexico) the hypothesis that EMP does not
help explain current φ is rejected at the 95 percent level or better (as Table 1
shows). For all countries except Thailand, there are significant IRFs for at least
one period (as Table 3 shows). Of these, responses are positive in Korea, Brazil,
and Mexico. For Indonesia, there is an initial positive response whose t-statistic
equals 1.98, offset by a negative response after 3 months but a positive response
after 6 months. For Chile, the initial response is negative.
Domestic credit shocks (wδ ) affect interest differentials (φ ) negatively in some
countries (consistent with a liquidity effect), but positively in others (consistent
with a Fisher effect). Such a finding should not be surprising, given the theoreti-
cally ambiguous nature of the link between these two variables, as mentioned in
the previous section. For four of the six countries (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and
Brazil) the hypothesis that δ does not help explain current φ is rejected at the 95
percent level or better (see Table 1). For all countries except Mexico, there are
significant responses for at least one period, as Table 3 shows. For Indonesia,
Korea, Brazil, and Chile, the responses are positive, suggesting that the Fisher
effect dominates the liquidity effect in these countries. (Such a response is not
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27An IRF is significant if its t-statistic exceeds |2|.Evan Tanner
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Table 1. Summary of Estimates,Vector Autoregression System (5),
Eq. (5) Xt = a0 + a1Xt–1 + a2Xt–2 + .... + vt,    X = ( ,EMP, )
Individual Country Estimates, 1990–98 (monthly data)
Brazil Chile Mexico Indonesia Korea Thailand
Dependent Variable: δ
F-Test, Exclusion of:
Lagged   34.65 2.78 2.15 1.70  10.04 1.11 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.08) (0.16) (0.00) (0.36)
Lagged EMP 6.54  2.29  3.12  11.63  9.69  4.32 
(0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lagged   33.12 2.55 1.05 2.09 1.47 0.46 
(0.00) (0.04) (0.39) (0.09) (0.22) (0.77)
R2 Adjusted 0.87 0.11 0.05 0.43 0.43 0.10 
Dependent Variable: EMP
F-Test, Exclusion of:
Lagged   4.04 0.34 0.70 6.46 3.22 3.55 
(0.00) (0.85) (0.59) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Lagged EMP 8.21  2.86  0.15  2.50  2.41  3.40 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.96) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01)
Lagged   5.82 0.65 2.78 6.71 1.83 2.12 
(0.00) (0.63) (0.03) (0.00) (0.13) (0.09)
R2 Adjusted 0.64 0.03 0.03 0.49 0.28 0.16 
Dependent Variable: φ
F-Test, Exclusion of:
Lagged   16.50 1.10 0.39  12.23 2.37 2.07 
(0.00) (0.36) (0.81) (0.00) (0.06) (0.09)
Lagged EMP 0.76  1.58  2.26  2.86  17.31  0.59 
(0.55) (0.19) (0.07) (0.03) (0.00) (0.67)
Lagged   25.97 25.64  4.00 16.48  1.50  1.27 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.29)
R2 Adjusted 0.76 0.50 0.29 0.64 0.60 0.16 
Note: For all estimates, 4 lags are used. P-statistics in parentheses.   = growth of domestic
credit (scaled by base money).  EMP = exchange depreciation plus reserves loss (scaled by base
money).   = change in interest differential. For Korea and Mexico, since   is nonstationary, system
includes first–difference (  ) instead.surprising for Brazil and Chile, where inflation rates are typically higher than in
the Asian countries). 
As a policy reaction function, in most cases, EMP shocks (wE) affect domestic
credit (δ ) positively. For four of the six countries (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and
Brazil) the hypothesis that lagged EMP does not help explain current δ is rejected
at the 99 percent level or better, as Table 1 shows. Moreover, for all there are
significant responses for at least one period, as shown in Table 4. In all cases, these
are positive, suggesting that the authorities respond, on average, to increased EMP
by providing additional liquidity to the banking system (rather than contracting the
money supply). Note, however, that responses for Brazil and Chile come later than
for the other countries (after 3 months). Note also that among all countries,
responses for Chile are the weakest. By contrast, there are relatively strong
responses within two months for Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and Mexico. 
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Table 2. Impulse Response Functions,Vector Autoregression System (5)
Responses of EMP to shocks to domestic credit (w ) and 
interest differential (w )
Brazil Chile Mexico Indonesia Korea Thailand
Shock to δ
Period 0 2.18  0.73  13.84  2.29  4.62  4.61 
(2.39) (2.95) (8.77) (2.30) (5.19) (6.35)
Period 1 1.07  0.04  0.47  2.92  3.54  2.15 
(1.25) (0.18) (0.27) (2.93) (3.69) (2.16)
Period 2 0.66  0.04  –2.23 3.27 0.50 1.89 
(0.92) (0.16) (–1.29) (2.65) (0.47) (1.69)
Period 3 1.55  0.06  0.63  1.99  2.34  1.83 
(2.36) (0.26) (0.39) (1.85) (2.24) (1.68)
Period 4 0.50  0.10  –1.33  –2.09  –0.66 2.03 
(0.69) (0.48) (–0.67) (–1.84) (–0.71) (1.65)
Period 5 –0.93  –0.05  –1.82 0.69  –1.98 0.28 
(–1.38) (–0.46) (–1.36) (0.64) (–2.32) (0.34)
Shock to φ
Period 1 1.11  0.31  –3.71  –2.51 0.58  –0.95 
(1.35) (1.29) (–2.09) (–2.65) (0.69) (–1.20)
Period 2 –0.31 0.15 2.67  –1.20  –1.63  –2.02 
(–0.38) (0.57) (1.63) (–1.15) (–1.62) (–2.11)
Period 3 –2.86  –0.13  –0.78  –2.76  –2.09  –0.74 
(–3.20) (–0.51) (–0.40) (–2.72) (–1.91) (–0.73)
Period 4 –4.22  –0.14  –2.96 2.30  –1.05 1.68 
(–4.93) (–0.64) (–1.74) (2.17) (–1.22) (1.65)
Period 5 –3.06  –0.06  –0.60 3.74  –0.01 0.63 
(–3.69) (–0.29) (–0.48) (3.15) (–0.01) (0.75)
Period 6 –2.80  –0.11 0.19 2.02 0.00  –0.63 
(–3.37) (–0.69) (–0.18) (1.86) (0.00) (–0.93)
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.In the case of Mexico, findings here confirm one of the key elements of the
1994–95 crisis, namely, sterilization of reserve outflows by the monetary authority
(see Flood, Garber, and Kramer, 1996).28 Moreover, these finding suggest that, in
Asia, like Mexico, such sterilization also occurred.
Evidence regarding responses of δ to interest differential shocks (φ ) is weaker
than that regarding δ and EMP above. For three of the six countries (Indonesia,
Brazil, Chile) the hypothesis that lagged φ does not help explain current δ is
rejected at the 99 percent level or better (see Table 1). However, the direction of
the responses is mixed, as Table 4 shows. In both Chile and Brazil, there are posi-
tive and significant responses after one month. That is, in these cases, the author-
ities respond to higher interest rates with higher growth to domestic credit. 
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Table 3. Impulse Response Functions,Vector Autoregression System (5)
Responses of Interest Differential (  ) to shocks to 
domestic credit (w ) and EMP (wE)
Brazil Chile Mexico Indonesia Korea Thailand
Shock to δ
Period 0 1139.11  0.33  0.93  0.18  –0.04  –0.95 
(3.37) (0.50) (3.97) (2.45) (–1.13) (–1.20)
Period 1 753.51  0.02  0.91  –0.06 0.04  –2.02 
(1.96) (0.03) (3.52) (–0.61) (0.83) (–2.11)
Period 2 2001.58  –0.27 0.25 0.05 0.14  –0.74 
(6.42) (–0.35) 0.95) (0.43) (2.87) (–0.73)
Period 3 827.85  –0.88 0.33 0.40 0.04 1.68 
(2.89) (–1.06) (1.30) (3.91) (0.69) (1.65)
Period 4 –157.70  –1.49 0.39 0.20 0.17 0.63 
(–0.64) (–1.77) (1.33) (2.29) (2.99) (0.75)
Period 5 –65.31  –0.96  –0.26 0.21 0.12  –0.63 
(–0.29) (–1.53) –(1.18) (2.23) (2.38) (–0.93)
Shock to EMP
Period 1 803.81  –1.42 0.48 0.14  –0.02  –0.04 
(2.59) (–2.24) (2.08) (1.98) (–0.38) (–0.54)
Period 2 319.09  0.59  0.53  0.01  0.27  –0.08 
(0.84) (0.67) (1.79) (0.16) (6.04) (–1.19)
Period 3 19.84  0.21  0.19  –0.19 0.23 0.04 
(0.05) (0.23) (0.75) (–2.23) (4.64) (0.62)
Period 4 –15.08  –0.62 0.78  –0.12 0.12 0.07 
(–0.03) (–0.68) (2.74) (–1.39) (1.88) (1.08)
Period 5 –129.44  –0.64 0.22 0.15 0.09  –0.11 
(–0.29) (–0.69) (0.71) (1.73) (1.41) (–1.64)
Period 6 383.85  –0.38  –0.28 0.37 0.05  –0.01 
(0.95) (–0.43) –(1.22) (3.66) (0.80) (–0.28)
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.
28Indeed, this finding is somewhat stronger than that of Calvo and Mendoza (1996), who report that,
while domestic credit growth Granger causes reserve outflows, the reverse is not true. In Brazil, however, there are strong negative effects after 3 months. Also, in
Indonesia, there is a negative effect, but with a 5-month lag. 
As discussed in Section II, parameters may not be stable over time, and may
vary according to whether the exchange rate is fixed or floating. To address this
issue, Sims’s (1980) likelihood ratio statistic (see also Hamilton, 1994, pp.
297–99) yields a test for the stability of estimates for countries whose fixed (or
tightly pegged) exchange rate becomes more flexible after a crisis, namely
Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand.29 This test statistic did not exceed the 90
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Table 4. Impulse Response Functions,Vector Autoregression System (5)
Responses of Domestic Credit Growth (δ ) to shocks to EMP (wE) 
and interest differential (wφ )
Brazil Chile Mexico Indonesia Korea Thailand
Shock to EMP
Period 1 6.44  –0.09 1.62 0.35  5.44 2.37 
(1.61) (–0.54) (1.00) (0.31) (5.20) (3.43)
Period 2 3.60  –0.26 5.29 7.04  –0.41 0.34 
(0.87) –(1.51) (3.45) (5.25) (–0.37) (0.44)
Period 3 13.71  0.46  0.01  2.02  –1.51  –1.06 
(2.59) (2.67) (0.01) (1.63) (–1.31) (–1.41)
Period 4 –2.16  –0.07  –1.91 1.86  –0.95 0.12 
(–0.39) (–0.37) (–1.22) (1.40) (–0.69) (0.17)
Period 5 10.38  –0.03  –0.80 1.64  –2.99 0.05 
(2.05) (–0.32) (–0.72) (1.41) (–2.66) (0.10)
Period 6 4.28  –0.06  –0.27 2.13  –1.49 0.15 
(0.78) (–0.56) (–0.25) (1.85) (–1.49) (0.34)
Shock to φ
Period  1 8.77 0.47 0.44  –1.24 0.15  0.59 
(2.11) (3.20) (0.27) (–0.92) (0.19) (0.83)
Period 2 –5.95 0.13  –0.21  –1.85 0.88  –1.11 
(–1.44) (0.81) (–0.14) (–1.55) (0.85) (–1.36)
Period 3 –31.56 0.06 –1.76 1.76  –2.75  –0.66 
(–6.68) (0.37) (–1.02) (1.25) (–2.73) (–0.91)
Period 4 –23.50  –0.10  –1.70  –1.71  –2.15 0.16 
(–4.49) (–0.75) (–1.26) (–1.13) (–2.27) (0.20)
Period 5 –21.31  –0.01  –0.19  –3.77 0.75  0.63 
(–3.99) (–0.13) (–0.18) (–3.03) (1.05) (1.24)
Period 6 –22.02  –0.10  –0.20 1.54 0.03 0.46 
(–3.97) (–1.02) (–0.21) (1.26) (0.04) (0.97)
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.
29That is, dummy interacts on lagged values of X are included the unrestricted version of the regres-
sion. Insufficient observations prevent this test from being applied to Brazil. Sims’ (1980) statistic is
λ =( T–  k ) {log |Ω R| – log|Ω U|}, where T = total observations minus lags, k = 1 + np, n = number of vari-
ables, p = number of parameters per equation, and Ω R and Ω U are the variance-covariance matrices for the
restricted and unrestricted versions of the regression, respectively. The statistic is distributed χ 2 with
degrees of freedom (d.f.) equal to the number of restrictions. Since there are 3 variables, 2 lags, and 3 equa-
tions, d.f. = 18. Thus, critical values for λ are 26.0 (90 percent) and 28.9 (95 percent). Values of λ are:
Mexico, 5.57; Indonesia, 4.12; Korea, 7.94; and Thailand, 4.86. percent critical value for any country. Thus, there is no statistically significant
difference in the precrisis and postcrisis parameters. 
Pooled Estimates, 1996–98
Unlike individual country estimates, pooled estimates can provide a sense of the
average relationships among the variables during the recent round of crises.
Results of pooled estimates for the recent period (1996–98) including adjusted
R2s, exclusion (Granger causality) tests, and impulse response functions (with
corresponding standard errors) are summarized in Table 5.30 Impulse response
functions and their corresponding standard errors are also presented visually, in
Figures 2 through 7.
Like individual country estimates, shocks to the credit variable (δ ) are posi-
tively associated with movements in EMP. As Part Aof Table 5 shows, the hypoth-
esis that lagged δ do not help explain current EMP is rejected at better than the 99
percent level (with an F-statistic of 5.08). And, as Part B of the same table shows
(see also Figure 2), there is a positive and significant contemporaneous response:
a 1 percent shock to domestic credit leads to a change in exchange market pres-
sure that exceeds 5 percent, consistent with individual country estimates. 
Unlike individual country estimates, the evidence suggests that shocks to the
interest differential (∆φ ) do not affect EMP. As Part A of Table 5 shows, the
hypothesis that lagged ∆φ do not help explain current EMP is not rejected at
conventional levels. And, as Part B of the same table shows (see also Figure 3),
there are no significant impulse response functions. 
Like individual country estimates, some evidence suggests that shocks to
EMP affect the interest differential positively. As Part A of Table 5 shows, the
hypothesis that EMP does not help explain current ∆φ is not rejected at conven-
tional levels. However, as Part B shows (see also Figure 4), there are significant,
positive responses, after four months. 
Some evidence also suggests that domestic credit shocks (δ ) affect interest
differentials (∆φ ) positively (consistent with a Fisher effect). The hypothesis that
δ does not help explain current ∆φ is not rejected at conventional levels (Part A,
Table 5). However, there are significant, positive responses after three months
(Part B, Table 5, and Figure 5). 
As is the case for most individual country estimates, EMP shocks affect
domestic credit (δ ) positively. As Part A of Table 5 shows, the hypothesis that
lagged EMP does not help explain current δ is rejected at better than the 99 percent
level (with an F-statistic of 10.65). And, as Part B of the same table shows (see
also Figure 6), there are significant, positive responses after one month. 
However, δ does not appear to respond to interest differential shocks (∆φ ). As
Part A of Table 5 shows, the hypothesis that lagged ∆φ does not help explain
current δ is not rejected at conventional levels. And, as Part B of the same table
shows (see also Figure 7), there are no significant responses. 
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30Estimates include country intercepts, not reported.  In the pooled estimates, the interest differential
is entered as a first difference (∆φ ) for all countries.Like individual country estimates, the stability of parameters before and after
crisis periods is examined with the Sims’s (1980) statistic. As before, the value of
this test statistic was below the 90 percent critical value, so the hypothesis of
equality between precrisis and postcrisis parameters is not rejected. Also, IRF
results were, for the majority of cases, insensitive to the ordering of variables in
the Choleski decomposition. However, for those cases where EMP was entered
first (implausibly assuming that EMP is an exogenous variable) δ  failed to cause
the expected, positive response in EMP. 
V. Policy Implications and Conclusions
This paper has examined the relationship between EMP and monetary policy
during the 1990s in several emerging market economies, namely, Brazil, Chile,
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Table 5. Summary of Estimates,Vector Autoregression System (5)
(5) Xt = a0 + a1Xt–1 + a2Xt–2 + .... + vt,    X = (δ ,EMP,∆φ )
Pooled Estimates, 1996–98 (monthly data)
A. F–Tests for Exclusion (P–statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: δ EMP ∆φ
F–Test, Exclusion of:
Lagged δ 2.16 5.08 1.03
(0.08) (0.00) (0.39)
Lagged EMP 10.65 8.63 0.79
(0.00) (0.00) (0.53)
Lagged ∆φ 1.28 0.45 122.31
(0.28) (0.78) (0.00)
R
2 Adjusted 0.21 0.18 0.89
B. Impulse Response Functions (t–statistics in parentheses)
Responses of: EMP ∆φ δ
Shock to: δ∆ φδ EMP EMP ∆φ
Period 0 5.07  – 0.07 0.10  ––
(5.48) – (0.42) (0.58) ––
Period  1 0.71  –1.29 0.41  0.34 4.43  –0.89 
(0.64) (–1.32) (1.78) (1.46) (3.56) (–0.71)
Period  2 1.36  –0.41 0.48  0.52 6.15 2.42 
(1.23) (–0.41) (1.82) (1.98) (4.89) (1.97)
Period  3 –1.03  –0.18 0.68  0.55 1.82  –0.98 
(–0.99) (–0.18) (2.32) (1.71) (1.46) (–0.72)
Period  4 –2.96 0.08  0.83 0.75 2.49  –0.67 
(–2.95) (0.13) (2.69) (2.09) (2.07) (–0.71)
Period  5 –0.51  –0.42 0.65  0.93 1.41 0.49 
(–0.85) (–0.58) (2.17) (2.61) (1.56) (0.52)
Period  6 0.24  –0.70 0.58  0.90  –0.19  –0.37 
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Figure 2. Response of EMP to One Unit Shock to Credit Growth (δ )
(in percent)










Figure 3. Response of EMP to One Unit Shock to Interest Differential (∆φ )
(in percent)








Figure 4. Response of Interest Differential (∆φ ) to One Unit Shock to EMP
(in percent)
Note: Dotted lines are 2-times standard errors.EXCHANGE MARKET PRESSURE AND MONETARY POLICY
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Figure 5. Response of Interest Differential (∆φ ) to One Unit Shock to Credit Growth (δ )
(in percent)










Figure 6. Response of Credit Growth (δ ) to One Unit Shock to EMP
(in percent)














Figure 7. Response of Credit Growth (δ ) to One Unit Shock to Interest Differential (∆φ )
(in percent)
Note: Dotted lines are 2-times standard errors.Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. Because exchange rate regimes in these
economies were neither perfectly fixed nor free floating, it would be misleading
to focus exclusively on either reserve or exchange rate movements. Rather, EMP
is more appropriate, as it summarizes the difference between the growth rates of
money supply and demand under managed exchange rate regimes. 
Evidence was presented that one measure of monetary policy, domestic
credit growth, has powerful impacts on EMP in the “right” direction: a reduc-
tion in the domestic credit component of the money supply helps to reduce EMP
(either by increasing the value of a country’s currency, or its stock of interna-
tional reserves, or both). This finding held for both individual country and
pooled estimates. This finding also supports evidence by Goldfajn and Gupta
(1998) that contractionary monetary policy helps support the exchange rate, but
not work by Radetlet and Sachs (1998) and Furman and Stiglitz (1998), whose
research finds the opposite. 
In a related vein, evidence regarding the response of EMP to interest shocks
was somewhat weaker than that linking EMP and domestic credit growth. There
is some evidence from some individual countries (but not from pooled estimates)
that positive interest differential shocks also help to reduce EMP. This finding,
however, should not cast doubt on the effectiveness of monetary policy for
affecting EMP. Rather, this finding underscores the fact that interest rates have
market-determined (as well as policy-determined) elements.31
Some insights were also provided into the determinants of interest differen-
tials. There is some evidence, both from individual country and pooled estimates,
that shocks to EMP positively affect interest rates. This makes sense, given that
higher EMP may signal both exchange depreciation and risk. However, the effect
of domestic credit shocks on the interest differential works positively for higher
inflation countries like Brazil and Chile (reflecting a Fisher effect) and for the
pooled estimates, but negatively for lower inflation countries like Korea and
Thailand (reflecting a liquidity effect). 
Finally, the paper provided some evidence (in both individual country and
pooled estimates) that monetary authorities respond to increases of EMP by
expanding rather than contracting domestic credit, a finding discussed by others in
the context of the 1994–95 Mexican crisis. 
Such a policy reaction may represent an error in perception that results in a
vicious circle, since an initial rise in EMP may be due to a fall in money demand
that the central bank incorrectly perceives to be temporary. However, such a policy
may also reflect a weak financial system. In both Mexico and Asia, such weakness
was evident prior to the crises. Nonperforming assets in the financial system
represent implicit liabilities of the public sector. Because compensating fiscal
adjustments did not occur before the crises, and it was politically impossible to let
unsound institutions fail, policymakers may have had few alternatives other than
to extend credit to such institutions, even though it was destabilizing. Put differ-
ently, prior to the crises, monetary policies were “too loose” in a systematic way.
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31Also, the policymaker and the econometrician have two distinct data sets. For the econometrician,
it is often difficult to distinguish between policy- and market-determined components of interest rates.Other preventative measures, and a different political environment, may have
provided central bankers with more options. 
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